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Green v. Commonwealth
546 S.E.2d 446 (Va. 2001)
. Faas
Kevin Green ("Green") was convicted of capital murder for the killing of
Patricia L. Vaughn during the commission of a robbery and was sentenced to
death. On appeal, Green challenged the circuit court's denial of a motion to
exclude two potential jurors, Charles Overby ("Overby') and Edith Pearson
("Pearson"). During voir dire, Overby stated that he believed in "an ey3e for an
eye, tooth for a tooth," and that the defendant "didn't give his victim any consid-
eration when he took their life."' Pearson, on the other hand, indicated that she
had already decided that the defendant was guilty of the charges on the basis of
1. Green v. Commonwealh, 546 S.E2d 446,448 (Va. 2001). The court cited much of the
colloquy of Overby's voir dire. The critical aspects of Overby's voir dire included the following:
THE COET: Do you know of n bias or prejudie whatsoever which would keen
ufrom being able to ive a fartrit both to tih Commonweath and to the ed
MROVERBY: I onlyielieve in the Bible an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth...
THE COURT: This case involves the possibliktof capitalpunishment. Do you have
anop"non such as would prevent you from convicting anyone of an offense punish-
agd eath
MR. OVERBY: No sir...
(DEFENDANTS ATTORNEyJ: Would you always vote to impose the deathpenaky
in eveiy case where a defendant is found ilk of a capital offense?
MR. OVERBY Yes sir If itwas pro gu s,k I would vote for
EFENDANTS A IE If the mnz wealth proves it bewnd a reason-
able doubt that the defendant comimitted a capital offense, you would vote for the
MROERY Yes.
[DEFENDAINS ATr'ORN'EY]: You would not give any consideration to a lesser
P CE B :N. edd' give his victim any consideration when he took their
life ....
[DEFENDANTS ATI ORNEYJ The two possibilities Mr Overby, if [the defen-
dant] is found guilty of a capital offense wouldbe, one, Iet and number two, life
without parole. And what we would Me to be sure is that if the Cmmonwealth
proves beyond a reasonable doubt he's guiltyof a capital offense, are yqu going to vote
automatcally for death or can you give it your consideration to vote for life without
OVERBY: I would consideration to vote for life, but still there again, as I
said I would vote a 1eforanew as the Bible sa
[DEFENDANTS ATrORNEY]: What Im tinin you correct me if I'm wrona.
that what you are saying is if he is proved guily beyonda reasonable doubt of a capiti
offense you are goig to vote deth?
MR- OVERBY: It it should be. Right, yes, sir.
Id at 448-49.
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newspaper accounts she had read prior to trial.2 The circuit court nevertheless
seated both prospective jurors over defense objections
II. Hdd v
The Supreme Court of Virginia held unanimouslythat the trial court abused
its discretion and committed manifest error in seating the challenged jurors.4 The
court reversed the capital murder conviction and death sentence and remanded
the case for a new trial5
Iff. A raiIswi /Apphioai in Vvgia
The question before the court on appeal was whether the circuit court
abused its discretion in refusing to remove Overby and Pearson from the jury
panel 6 Writing the opinion of the court, Justice Hassell explained that the circuit
court abused its discretion by empaneling jurors when there was a reasonable
doubt as to their impartiality.' The court held that Overby's statements reflected
a strong belief in capital punishment and were sufficient to create a reasonable
2. Id at 449. The critical aspects of Pearson's voir dire included the following:
THE (OURT: Do you know anything about (the case]) Have you ever read about it,
heard about it?
MS. PEARSON: Read a little bit in the paper...
THE COURT: Have ivu formed anyopunon or expressed ayopinion as to the guilt
or innocence of [the defendant]?
MS. PEARSON No. I suppose he's ut...
THE COURT: Why do you lie's guiltI
MS. PEARSON: Well, ist from what I read. ysayhe was there...
[DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY]: Do I understand'yu to say in answer to the
Judge's questions that you suppose the defendant is-guilty because of what you read
MS. P SON: Yes.
[DEFENDANT'S ATrORNEY]: Do you feel like the defense is going to have to
prove him innocent to you if you sit as a juror?
MS. PEARSON: Yes, I sposeIdo...
[DEFENDANITS ATO If ym presented no evidence at alt, the defense
then am I assuming correctly that you have made up your mind that you would find
him guoflthe r _cre?
MS. PEARSON: Yes...
[DEFENDANTS ATrORNEY1 Do you understand that the defense under the law
doesn't have to produce any evidence?
MS. PEARSON: Yes.
[DEFENDANTS ATrORNEYL All right. Understandig that, if we don't, isyour
verdict in this case - Are you telling us right now it's going to be guilty if we on't
present any evidence, the defense?
MS. PEARSON: I feel so.
Id at 449-50.
3. Id at 449-50.
4. Id at 451.
5. Id at 452.
6. 1d at447.
7. Id at 452.
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doubt as to his ability to vote for a sentence other than death in the event of a
guiltyverdict' The unanimous decision was the first time the Supreme Court of
Virginia has reversed a death sentence for the seating of a juror who was biased
in favor of death.' The court similarly found that Pearson's views reflected that
she held preconceived notions of the guilt of the defendant and might not be
able to reach an impartial determination on guilt or innocence."0
The court went on to hold that the trial court's abuse of discretion consti-
tuted reversible error." The voir dire of both jurors reflected at least the possi-
bility that either or both was biased toward guilt (Pearson) and death (Overb).
Since all questions about juror qualifications must be resolved in favor of the
defendant, the court explained that a juror's abilityto give a defendant an impar-
tial trial cannot be left to chance. 2
A. In rf/r Vui,* Code Swi,8.o1-358
The Code of Virginia provides that a party may question any juror as to
whether she is related to any party, is interested in the cause, has a fixed opinion
regarding the cause, or "is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein" and may
object to any juror that appears biased.3 The language of Section 8.01-358 is
directed more toward guilt or innocence bias than toward the juror's predilec-
tions in sentencing and, indeed, the text of Section 8.01-358 has been used by
trial judges to restrict capital voir dire. The Supreme Court of Virginia's treat-
ment of jurors Pearson and Overbyin Gim makes dear that counsel-conducted
voir dire, granted by Section 8.01-358, extends equally to trial on guilt or inno-
cence and sentence. As to juror Pearson, who was predisposed to guilt, the court
found that "she had formed firm opinions which would have impaired her ability
to be impartial and stand indifferent in the cause." 4 Similarly, when discussing
juror Overby, who was predisposed to the death sentence, the court stated that
"he had formed a fixed opinion about the punishment that the defendant should
8. Id
9. Sageg,Schmittv.Commowealth,547SE.d 186,195 (Va.200[1 (rejectingclaimthat
trial court abused its discretion by seating jurors who expressed willingness to automatically vote
for death penalty).
10. Gw; 546 S.E.2d at 452.
11. Id at 451.
12. Id at 452 (citing Breeden v. Commonwealth, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (Va. 1976)).
13. VA. GODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Mlfchie 2000). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
The court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under oath any
person who is called as a juror therem and shall have e right to ask such person or
ruror direcyanyrelevant question to ascertain whether he ii related to either pary, or
has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any pinion, or is sensible of
any bias or prpeudice.therein; and the party objecting to any juror may introduce any
competent evidence in support of the objecotiL
Id
14. GCfn, 546 SE.2d at 452.
2001]
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receive if the defendant were convicted of a capital offense and, thus, Overby
was not impartial and 'indifferent in the cause."" The identity of language and
the very direct connection of that language with the text of Section 8.01-358 can
only mean that the Section 8.01-358 issues, especially the "opinion" and "bias"
issues, applyto capital voir dire. Section 8.01-358, therefore, mandates counsel-
conducted capital voir dire exploring a juror's predisposition toward the death
penalty.If Gxnleft anydoubt about the reach of Section 8.01-358, that doubt was
erased by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Hiv Cacmnua h. 6 Hi! is a
felony case in which the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to ask on
voir dire whether a prospective juror could "consider the full range of penalty for
the charges." 7 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new sentenc-
ing proceeding, holding that the defense was entitled to explore juror bias as to
sentence. 8 In its unanimous opinion, the court explained that "in order for
counsel to properlyexplore [sic] whether the jurypanel maybe irrevocablybiased
toward one end or the other of the sentencing spectrum, it is proper for counsel
to inform the panel of the sentencing parameters."" The court maintained that
re-sentencing was necessary, because the defendant did not receive an opportu-
nityto determine whether the jurors "stood indifferent in the cause."20 The Hill
opinion explicitly relied on the language of Section 8.01-358.21 Hidl and CGne
require trial courts to permit counsel-conducted voir dire into sentencing issues.
B. PorDisara Re;raing Case
Gren falls in a line of cases suggesting that the Supreme Court of Virginia
is reining in the discretion that trial judges enjoy in determining whether to
exclude a prospective juror for cause. Generally, the appellate courts in Virginia
will deferentially review the trial court's determinations that a juror is impartial
on the issues of guilt or innocence and sentencing. This is because the trial court
is in a better position to make those decisions.'
The court took a similar limiting approach in Modid v mnmailth.23 The
defendant was charged with, inter alia, rape and attempted forcible sodomy.24 At
15. Ict
16. Seealso I2U v. Commonwealth, 550 S.E2d 351, 352-53 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
17. Id at 352.
18. Id at 354.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 352-53.
22. Sw eg, Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866,875 (Va. 2000) (holding that the trial
court is in a superior position to determine juror's qualifications and that trial court's ruling will not
be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion).
23. Medici v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 28 (Va. 2000).
24. Id at 29.
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voir dire, Medici moved to strike Inga Bennett from the panel because Bennett's
husband had been murdered and both Medici and the alleged murderer of
Bennett's husband were represented by the public defender's office." The trial
court refused, however, to strike Bennett for cause because the prospective juror
"was very adamant that she could be objective in the case."26 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed, holding that even if Bennett was convinced that she
could be impartial, the diminution of public confidence in the process resulting
from the appearance of bias mandated reversal27
The Maia court relied heavily on QvGmd v Cra ,s a tort action in which
the trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike a prospective juror.29
During voir dire, prospective juror Clingempeel admitted that she was repre-
sented by an attorney in the same firm as the plaintiff's counsel' ° Cingempeel
also stated that she was represented bythe attorneyin a tort cause similar to that
at issue in the case.31 In ruling on the defendant's motion to strike, the trial court
stated that in that particular jurisdiction the association of Clingempeel and the
plaintiff's counsel was not prejudicial per se and would not necessarily lead to
obvious bias.32 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded for a new
trial, stating public confidence in the integrity of trials could not be sustained
when a client of a firm representing one of the parties to the action was permit-
ted to sit on the jury, even if the juror sincerely believed that she could be
impartia 3
In Cay j Vugma Beaz v Git Squa Sh irg Cner Ca,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled in an eminent domain case that the trial court abused its
discretion for failing to strike a prospective commissioner.3 During voir dire,
25. Id at 30.
26. Id
27. Id at 31.
28. 523 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 2000).




33. Id at 504. Cam Barrett v. Commonwealh, 542 S.E2d 23,26 (Va. Q. App. 2001) (en
banc). In Barmv defendant was charged with assaulting a police officer. Bamr, 542 S.E.2d at 24.
The circuit court permitted a juror to sit who was the brother to one of the police officers on the
scene of the incident. Id at 24-25. The juror admitted in voir dire that he would be likelyto assign
more crediility to his brother's testimony than to the testimony of the defendant, but maintained
that he could remain impartial Id at 24. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the circuit
court did not commit error in seating the juror because the record showed that the prospective
juror was capable of remaining impartial in spite of his familial relationship to one of the Common-
wealh's witnesses. Id at 26.
34. 498 S.E2d 917 (Va. 1998).
35. Cty of Virginia Beach v. Giant Square Shopping Cr. Co., 498 S.E2d 917, 919 (Va.
1998). In eminent domain cases, the value of compensation for the land taken is determined by
"disinterested freeholders" serving as commissioners. Id at 918 (citing VA. CODE ANN. 5 25-4620
2001]
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George R C McGuire admitted that one of the partners in the Giant Square
company was his attorney and one of the other partners had worked for him as
an appraiser.' McGuire also admitted that the Cityhad previously acquired some
of his own property."' During an individual examination, McGuire explained that
Grover Wright, one of the Giant Square partners, had represented him in a
condemnation trial against the City and that D.L. McKnight, another Giant
Square partner, had appraised McGuire's propertyin the condemnation action. 8
In spite of these contacts, the trial court refused the Caty's motion to strike
McGuire. 9 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, stating that "it is extremely
unlikely the public would have confidence in the integrity of the process when
a commissioner has the identity of interests demonstrated by this prospective
commissioner."
40
The above line of cases demonstrates a reticence on the part of the Supreme
Court of Virginia to grant trial judges unfettered discretion in seating jurors. The
dicta in these cases indicates that the court is primarily concerned with the
appearance of bias in the proceedings, rather than a showing of actual prejudice.
Gmv; however, departs slightly from this reasoning, in that the court is more
concerned with substantive fairness than with public perceptions.41 One explana-
tion for this departure is the obvious difference in gravity between a civil action
or a non-capital prosecution and a death penaltycase. Another possible explana-
tion is that the Supreme Court of Virginia has simplydecided no longer to grant
trial judges such broad discretion in determining juror qualifications. Whatever
the explanation, it appears that the selection of the jury is one area where the
court is willing to give defendants a more searching review.
Damien P. DeLaney
(Michie 2000)). The selection of these commissioners is analogous to the selection of a jury.




40. Id at 919.
41. Gw; 546 S.E.2d at 452 (stating that anyreasonable doubt... regarding whether a juror
stands indifferent in the cause ... must be resolved in favor of the defendante).
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